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I did write a fair amount about the formation of the next government in the tallyboard thread but it's got somewhat buried in the postcount pages and I wanted to do a new thread to discuss the different pathways to government that might occur after the election. At this time we are starting to see what I suspect will be rather a lot of gnashing and wailing on the pages of The Australian (especially if Labor keeps trying to form government) but a lot of it is clueless. (Just a note in case anyone thinks I am part of the gnashing and wailing for my tallyboard heading "Tasmania Remains Ungovernable" - nup, it was a reference to "become ungovernable"; I am celebrating the way Tasmanians collectively refused to be told what to do and gave the major parties back another mess.)
As I start this article the numbers sit at Liberal 14 Labor 10 Greens 5 IND 4. The Shooters, Fishers and Farmers are strongly placed in Lyons and the last seat in Bass is a multi-party scramble with five or six contenders - we will know the outcome of that around August 2.
Meeting the House
The first thing I want to underline is that whatever the numbers, whatever the deals, whatever the deal-shaped objects, Jeremy Rockliff is the incumbent Premier. As the incumbent he has the clear right by convention to be recommissioned in order to "meet the house" and enable it to decide his destiny. Also he clearly intends to do it. It is common for Premiers in minority governments who appear to have lost the election (and it is not clear this is the case for Rockliff yet) to do this, because in theory an MP who was going to back the opposition might change their mind in the middle of the debate, and because decisions about whether a Premier has lost confidence should be made by Parliaments and not by the Governor's reading of MP's letters. The widespread misreading of Johnston's 2024 letters is a good example of why confidence needs to be determined on the floor. It is only where the office of Premier is vacant that the Governor must make a provisional decision.
The Australian quoted from a "constitutional law expert" Donald Rothwell who is actually primarily an international law expert suggesting that the Governor might intervene and refuse to recommission Rockliff for this purpose if there appeared to be a deal against him or even if he didn't have enough proof of stability. The ABC then talked to the same expert and made the same claim about his expertise, clearly copying The Australian in choice both of source and description. In fact, this would be completely contrary to precedent - Don Dunstan in 1968, Robin Gray in 1989, Rob Kerin in 2002 were all Australian Premiers who chose to "meet the House" though it was clear enough they would be voted out. (Well maybe not so clear to Edmund Rouse).
Two articles in the Australian have already catastrophised about Section 8B of the Constitution Act 1934 which obliges the Governor to fill all ministries by seven days after the return of the writs. This is a silly section that should be got rid of but the persistent arguments that it creates a crisis in government formation are just wrong. There is no problem with recommissioning the existing Premier and their nominated Ministers pending the sitting of parliament - if they are voted out, as Robin Gray's government was in 1989, no harm is done. Michael Stuckey's article writes "a caretaker government lacks legitimacy, which in turn could stall governance indefinitely,". Oh no how terrible! How indefinitely can a caretaker government stall governance if it either stands (at least to the degree that it can stop caretaking) or falls as soon as the parliament resumes?
Now, here are the three most obvious ways the current situation gets resolved. They are not the only possible solutions. This article is not to say which is the most likely, it is just to spell out what they look like and how they happen.
1. Liberal Government with confidence and supply
In this scenario the Liberals negotiate their way to 18 seats' worth of MPs who will give them confidence and supply so they can resume governing. They get to 16 with the 14 they have won, whoever wins Lyons (since it's between them and Carlo Di Falco) and David O'Byrne. I should point out that neither of those are givens yet. O'Byrne supported them in the last parliament, but did so on the basis that Labor did not have their hands up. Whether he would do so again if Labor were trying to form government is an open question - perhaps with the carrots including a path back to the party - but it's at least plausible that he could back the Liberals again instead. The Liberals then need to work with the Bass winner, who needs not to be Labor or the Greens, and they also need Craig Garland.
Although Garland voted for no confidence in Jeremy Rockliff in the last parliament he comes across as pragmatic and outcome focused and has said he is open to a confidence and supply deal but wants outcomes. Perhaps the Liberals can mend the fences with him but he is not at all likely to do it for free. Also there will be a high Embarrassment Factor for the government if they go down that path because they could have done that in June and we wouldn't be here.
Kristie Johnston and Peter George have both indicated they will not provide confidence and supply guarantees but will rather treat confidence and supply vote by vote, so at this stage I doubt they are a part of this scenario.
2. Liberal Government without guaranteed confidence and supply
In this scenario the Liberals may receive confidence and supply guarantees from some crossbenchers but they are short of 18 votes. However, they survive in the absence of a willingness to vote them out. This continues the situation they were in from August 2024 to June 2025 after the fallout from the collapse of the Jacqui Lambie Network grouping left them with new written confidence and supply agreements with Miriam Beswick and Rebekah Pentland but no formal agreement with Andrew Jenner. (As I will not tire of saying, they never really had one with Kristie Johnston, and anyone who thinks they did either hasn't read or can't read what Johnston actually said in her letters).
Even if this is the situation at the start of Parliament, the Liberals under Jeremy Rockliff (and that's an important proviso, it does not necessarily transfer if Rockliff is replaced) are entitled to remain in office until they lose another vote of no confidence. If that doesn't happen immediately, they can carry on because confidence exists in the absence of proof otherwise. If at any time the parliament decides to vote them out, then that's the end.
There are two versions of this scenario. The first is that Labor is ready to govern but there are enough crossbenchers who are unwilling to grant the Liberals confidence and supply, but also unwilling at least temporarily to vote for a no confidence motion to remove the Liberals. The government would last for as long as the crossbenchers took to change their mind. An interesting figure here is Peter George, because George comes to the parliament without the history of the rest of the left(ish) crossbenchers and has also said that he would not have supported the previous no-confidence motion. It may be he considers that supporting a no-confidence motion as a formality to form a new government is different to bringing down one that is already running.
This may sound unstable as hell, but we've been here before. From 1996 to 1998 the Liberals under Tony Rundle governed without a firm confidence and supply agreement with the crossbench Greens because the House declined to vote the government out.
It may still sound unstable as hell, because it is. The current situation is completely different in that whereas Labor pledged to govern in majority or not at all going into the 1996 election (with every candidate signing to that effect) in this case Labor went into the election open to minority government under conditions. So the Greens in particular only had the option of continuing to support the Rundle government or causing an election they'd be blamed for.
In the second variant, the crossbenchers have the numbers to vote the government out if Labor helps them but Labor has chosen to take the L. In this case the government continues until Labor decides it's time to take over. The problem with doing this for any lasting period is that the crossbench can demonstrate, via a motion of no confidence that Labor refuses to support, that Tasmania has become an effective grand coalition, and that Labor is no longer opposing and is keeping the government in office when they could be the government instead. There were hints in this direction in the previous Parliament but it never actually materialised on the floor.
This by the way is why Labor absolutely shouldn't at this stage concede. Labor would be criticised if they conceded for having an absurd position: they thought the state's budget was dire enough to send the government to an election, but then they choose to stay in Opposition rather than take government and do anything about it, in a situation where they clearly could.
3. Labor Government with presumptive confidence and supply
In this scenario, Labor or a willing crossbencher moves a no-confidence motion at the commencement of Parliament. In 1989 after some troubles with the standing order that required a two-thirds majority to suspend standing orders (which was set aside at the start of the 2024-5 parliament for that parliament only but should really be disposed of for good), the Greens and Labor effected this by moving an amendment to the Governor's Address In Reply. Like so:
However the wording of the motion this time could need considering given that there are some crossbenchers who have indicated they will vote on confidence and supply on a case by case basis. It might have to be adapted and those crossbenchers might need to indicate to the Governor that while they were not promising confidence and supply to the government indefinitely, it was their intention to support a Labor government and they expected, all else being equal, to be able to do so for some time. It would need to be clear to the Governor that no Liberal leader or Government was going to command the confidence of the House and that Labor was the only hope for stable government and had some realistic prospect of governing for at least a reasonable time.
(Governor Bennett's decision to make Michael Field and the Greens jump through hoops to demonstrate stable intentions before Field's government was sworn in has been controversial to say the least. The motion above plus perhaps confirmation from all involved of their stance should have been enough - see also Anne Twomey).
In terms of arrangements with the Greens, Labor would proceed with the Greens' support in passing the no confidence motion, but would based on their statements so far avoid making any deal with them. A deal is an exchange of desirables. A gift of confidence with nothing in return is not a deal. But there may already be discussions behind the scenes on how this not-a-deal would be delivered.
Installed in government, Labor would have daunting headaches. Under their current rules that preclude coalition governments with outside support, Labor would need to provide a ministry from a PLP of thirteen members. This is one fewer than in the 1989-1992 term, however the Labor Party's rules do allow them to accept independent ministers (just not ministers who represent another party), which could include Legislative Councillors. (I have had suggestions that the party's platform is moribund because of the federal intervention anyway and the PLP and admin committee will do what they like, but I don't expect Green ministers all the same.) Much like the Field government they would be faced with tough decisions in a fiscal crisis, but unlike the Field government they would have been aware of the crisis and promised only modest measures to address it, so every time they brought in harsh medicine they would be told that they knew yet hid their plans from the people.
Having in effect and in widespread public perception caused the election but polled their worst primary vote since 1903, with a swing from them to the sitting Government which had won the primary vote by 14 points (more than Gray in 1989), then taken government having not even tried to before they forced the election, Labor would face severe public legitimacy problems. The term would be marked by Concerned Voters Associations, constant calls for the abolition of Hare-Clark, though the same thing could have happened off these vote shares in terms of who governed in a single-seat system too - because so many left voters voted for the Greens and independents. I would probably need to set up a Media Bullshit Register page to deal with all the false claims being put to air by instant Tassie experts from the north island. (In fact I am not that far off doing that already). In some ways it would be worse than 1989 because even the Field Government did not take power after a primary vote swing to the government. And in 1989 there was no social media ... shudder!
Labor would also be supported by a crossbench with almost as many MPs as themselves which would be hungry to deliver outcomes for supporters and probably not content to spend four years sitting around supporting Labor in the name of stability and losing Laborial motions on the stadium, salmon, forestry and whatever else. The Greens might not want to give Labor guaranteed confidence and supply either, at least not for terribly long. The lurking threat of sudden execution can have a powerful effect in greening up a government around the edges.
The most likely combination for this scenario is all of Garland, Johnston and George, or two of them plus a favourable Bass winner. However Di Falco and O'Byrne aren't out of the possibility list yet.
Formal confidence and supply seems a lot less likely unless somebody changes their position but in theory 10 Labor + 5 Greens + favourable Bass winner + Garland + either Di Falco or O'Byrne. Even if the independents here are willing the question is why should the Greens be if it is in return for nothing.
We will learn much more about the chances of these options over the next few weeks. The counts are scheduled to finish on August 2, followed by the return of the writs which starts the one-week countdown for a Premier to be commissioned, but if it is not clear who will have 18 seats at that point then negotiations can continue all the way until Parliament actually sits (which I have heard but not confirmed is late September).
